1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

Different from previous foodborne zoonotic diseases, COVID-19 has raised global concerns about food security ([@bib41]; [@bib10]; [@bib34]). Since the outbreak of the pandemic, panic buying of food has occurred in many countries. What\'s worse, some countries have begun or are considering export restrictions ([@bib18]). The World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and other international organizations have issued calls to keep the global food trade open. The Extraordinary G20 Agriculture Ministers\' Meeting in April also confirmed the need for collective action to ensure that markets function well. After March, COVID-19 has spread across the globe more rapidly. By July 9th, over 12 million confirmed cases and 500 thousand deaths were reported in at least 200 countries, territories or areas ([@bib4]). Influenced by the Great Lockdown against the COVID-19 and the steep recession ([@bib35]), the food systems are under risk as never before, pushing increasing number of people under poverty, hunger and malnutrition ([@bib42]).

Although challenges in the global food supply chains have captured public attention, little is known about the effects of COVID-19 on agricultural production; most existing studies focus on logistics and distribution ([@bib11]; [@bib30]; [@bib29]; [@bib16]). In fact, lessons from China have shown that some countermeasures against COVID-19 disrupted production. This represents a nonnegligible threat to the long-term food supply ([@bib12]). Such production-undermining cases are not observed only in China, but also in other developing and developed countries. As a retrospective analysis of the pandemic period in China, this paper identified the impacts of COVID-19 on China\'s food production and corresponding policy responses. We hope that these practices could remind other countries that are experiencing serious outbreak to protect domestic agricultural production, and for China itself, to find way forward to consolidate production foundation in the food supply chain and build a more sustainable food system.

2. Previous experiences and current thinking {#sec2}
============================================

Foodborne zoonotic pathogens (FZP) are increasing in frequency ([@bib2]). Outbreaks of FZPs, such as HIV-AIDS (1970s-), SARS (2003), H5N1 (2005--2010), H1N1 (2009), MERS (2008-present), and Ebola (2015), have posed continuous threats to public health. When it comes to food security, their impacts vary due to the differences in transmissibility and the animal hosts of the pathogens.

Ebola, MERS, and SARS, with short incubation periods and high lethality rates, mainly shocked the food systems in certain areas where they spread ([@bib38]). They devastated agricultural production by damaging agricultural labor forces ([@bib23]) and hindering other input factors ([@bib15]). Decreasing production pushed the rural and the poor into food insecurity. After the outbreak of Ebola in 2014, more than 40% of the arable land in affected areas was not cultivated ([@bib9]), and Guinea\'s rice production dropped by 20% ([@bib45]). These diseases even slowed down the economic development ([@bib45]), and reduced the government\'s purchasing power in the international food market.

H5N1 and H1N1, with relatively low lethality and strong infectivity, ultimately resulted in global pandemics. But their impacts on food system were mainly on production sector rather than the whole supply chain. A large number of livestock and poultry were killed by the virus, or were disposed to stop the virus spreading. Besides, the demand for animal products decreased massively. During the H1N1 epidemic in 2009, 64% of the consumers in China stopped buying pork ([@bib37]), bringing \$270 million losses to the American Pork Association in the second quarter of 2009 ([@bib15]).

COVID-19 cannot be classified into either of the above two categories, neither of which raised concerns over global food security. At the beginning of the pandemic, some people believed that it would have little impact on the food supply ([@bib38]). The epidemic is believed to be more severe in densely populated cities than in rural areas ([@bib29]). Bulk commodities can be loaded and shipped by machines with minimum human-to-human interactions ([@bib38]). Besides, global food production is improving and stocks higher than the alert level ([@bib13]). However, panic with respect to food is spreading globally ([@bib10]; [@bib41], [@bib43]).

COVID-19 is destroying the agricultural production sector, which is the root of food system. Although the direct impacts will overwhelmingly be felt post-farm ([@bib29]), an increasing number of on-farm problems have been witnessed in various countries ([@bib36]). For example, in northwest India, wheat and pulse harvesting was disrupted because of non-availability of migrant labor ([@bib8]). In Ethiopia, vegetable farmers suffered not only from income loss due to overstocked products but also from a shortage of important inputs. This served to lower farmer income and reduce production intentions ([@bib33]). Even in the developed countries such as United States and Canada, overstocked milk, vegetables, livestocks, and poultry were dumped or destroyed ([@bib39]; [@bib1]). If these on-farm problems remain unsolved, the food supply chain would be more fragile and lose sustainability. More people who live on agricultural production would trap in poverty.

3. Agricultural responses in COVID-19 epidemic: Evidences from China {#sec3}
====================================================================

China is the first country that has controlled the COVID-19. Along with an unprecedented scale of protection and control measures across the country, the national emergency food supply system (NEFSS) started to gather, transport and distribute food. This system consists of the stockpiles of refined grain products in large and middle-size cities, emergency processing enterprises, emergency supply outlets, emergency distribution centers, and emergency storage and transportation enterprises. In addition, the "Cereal Bag" Provincial Governor Responsibility Mechanism (CBPGRM) and the "Food Basket" Mayor Responsibility Mechanism (FBMRM) also played important roles. The CBPGRM, which was officially issued in 2014, defines the responsibilities of provincial governments in ensuring food security in terms of production, circulation and consumption within their provinces. The FBMRM, which was introduced as "Food Basket" Program since 1988, requires the mayors to be responsible for the production and stable supply of meat, eggs, milk, fish, vegetables and fruit in their cities. Thanks to the quick reaction of NEFSS and the solid food supply basis guarded by CBPGRM and FBMRM, the food prices remain stable and food supply can meet the need ([@bib14]; [@bib5]).

3.1. Agricultural production disrupted by prevention and control measures {#sec3.1}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

As the epidemic continues, the Chinese government finds that some prevention and control measures are undermining agricultural production. It is also believed that the current stable food supply would not last long if these problems remain. The production in the next season may drop dramatically, threating national food security. With the sheer size of China\'s population ([@bib17]), this would have profound impact on the global food system.

### 3.1.1. Block product outflow channels {#sec3.1.1}

The traditional offline sales channels were cut off or inefficient during the epidemic. On one hand, the demand of agricultural products plummeted in the short term due to the quarantine measures. "Closed management of communities/villages" and "family outdoor restrictions\" policies decreased purchasing frequency and outdoor consumption significantly. The closure of conventional urban sales outlets resulted in purchasers failing to make purchases as planned. On the other hand, the distribution channels were fractured due to logistics restriction. At first, all the inter-region and intra-region logistics gave way to medical teams and supplies. Live poultry and swine distribution was forbidden in some areas with the thinking that they might be potential epidemic transmission channels. Then logistics restriction was loosen a bit, but both the drivers and the trunks on the road required strict certifications for safety. Consequently, the marketing quantity of the agricultural products dropped dramatically (see [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} ).Fig. 1Reduction in marketing quantity of grain, edible oil, animal products, vegetables and fruit during the COVID-19 epidemic in China.Notes: 1. Transaction changes were calculted in unit of weight (tonnes). 2. January 23rd is the day when Wuhan was placed under lockdown policy. 3. January 29th is the day when all provinces in China lauched Level Ⅰ responses to major public health emergency. 4. Numbers are calculted based on a big-data information platform called National Data Service Platform of Agricultural and Rural Response to COVID-19 set by MARA, <http://snsj.agri.cn/market-operation>.Fig. 1

The obstacles in outflow channels pushed sales pressure back to the production sectors, resulting in large amounts of unmarketable agricultural products. Most pig pens, chicken coops, fish ponds and farm lands were overstocked, especially for seasonal perishable products. China\'s major winter fruit-producing provinces (e.g., Guangxi, Hainan) and winter vegetable-producing provinces (e.g., Yunnan, Sichuan) sent out distress signals. The China Agricultural Product Marketing Association (CAPMA) collected 3482 pieces of overstocked agricultural product information across the nation from February 20th to March 31st, approximately 85 pieces per day. The information included 53% fruit, 18% animal products, 16% vegetables, 7% grain and edible oil, and 3% aquatic products (see [Fig. 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} ). This indicated that the epidemic has had a greater impact on perishable agricultural products than other products. The total overstocked weight recorded by CAPMA was over 2.76 million tones, including 21.64 million chickens, 11.08 million ducks, and 246.6 thousand pigs. These numbers only reflect a fraction of the total overstocked products.Fig. 2The breakdown of overstocked agricultural products information from CAPMA.Note: Distribution of the 3 482 pieces of overstocked information into clusters focused on different agricultural products. The figure refers to the number of reports regarding overstock agricultural products. The information was collected across the nation by CAPMA through an online platform from February 20th to March 31st. <http://www.ceninfo.net/index/dataInfo.htm?t=1>.Fig. 2

### 3.1.2. Hinder agricultural production inputs {#sec3.1.2}

The effect of the epidemic on labor inputs mainly lay on restricting labor movement. Farmers were not allowed to go out or gather under any circumstances except for shopping for necessities. This led to a shortage of labor and decreased production efficiency. Some grain-producing areas in the southeastern coastal provinces could not plant crops on time, due to the lack of migrant skilled grain growers from Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan provinces. Most farm service providers stopped working due to the fear of the epidemic or the traffic restrictions ([@bib40]). Some providers could plant 6 ha per day before the epidemic; however, after the epidemic broke out, they could only cover 3 ha per day because of the difficulty in hiring tractor drivers.

Crop planting were delayed to some extent. Chinese farmers usually complete their planting preparations around the Spring Festival. However, in this year most production inputs were not ready due to the lockdown policies. The online survey data collected from 1501 rural households by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) showed that 51.19% of respondents had difficulty buying fertilizers, pesticides, and other inputs, and 20.39% had no access to purchasing these necessities ([@bib49]). On the national level, data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) showed that the seed markets' opening time was delayed by 10--15 days, and seed sales decreased by 10%--30% by March 10th compared with the previous year ([@bib26]). Only 36% of rural households had direct access to fertilizers by March 4th ([@bib27]).

The breeding industry faced a serious feed shortage. Like other factories, feed mills were closed during the epidemic. Distribution of feed and veterinary drugs were cut off to stop the virus from spreading. As a result, many breeding farmers were short of feed stocks or even ran out of feed. Some poultry farms had no choice but to bury their baby chicks and ducks. According to the research from CAAS, over 60% of baby chicks were humanely disposed during the epidemic ([@bib46]). What\'s worse, the COVID-19 epidemic period overlapped with African swine fever (ASF) in China, which had reduced the pork supply sharply last year. The obstruction in veterinary drug transportation further crushed pig-breeding industry, bringing more difficulty in maintaining pork supply and driving price higher.

### 3.1.3. Destroy agricultural production cycles {#sec3.1.3}

The prevention and control measures broke the nature growth cycle of agricultural products, which would further disrupt the normal cycles of food supply and increase market volatility in the medium term. Agricultural production combines natural growth and economic activities. This feature determines that the planting and breeding should follow a set time frame ([@bib24]). The failure to plant or breed at the right time may result in production reduction.

In terms of staple grain, the pandemic shocked the early rice most in China. February and March, the worst time of the pandemic, are the sowing period of early rice, and the overwintering period of winter wheat. Some lockdown policies have delayed seeding and transplanting of early rice in South China for about 10 days, and farmland plowing in Central China. The impact on the winter wheat is much smaller because the time-critical works during the overwintering period are less and simpler. The middle rice, late rice and maize, whose sowing stages range from April to July across the whole country, were not affected directly. Considering the fact that the proportion of early rice in total grain production is only 5%, the impact of the COVID-19 on the staple grain is small. However, the risk of production reduction still raise concerns among the government and the public. On one hand, China has a huge population and the demand for staple grain are extremely inelastic. Reduction in supply may lead to soaring prices. On the other hand, this pandemic may accelerate the shift of the rice cropping system from the "double seasons" to "single season", which is believed to be a threat on the total production in the long term ([@bib6]).

The production of livestocks and poultry was severely disrupted in February. Animals need to eat every day, which requires intensive care from farmers ([@bib48]). The supply chains of perished food often operate on a "just in time" basis ([@bib3]). Therefore the timing of inputs and selling is often inflexible ([@bib32]). Social distancing and mandatory lockdown caused producers to miss some production windows, resulting in significant short-term disruptions. The reduction in the chicken production was estimated to be 1.46 million tons in the first quarter, which may reduce the total supply by 1.14 million tones in this year ([@bib50]). If quick actions could be taken to cope with this challenge, the short-term disruption would not evolve to be a long-term shock in the entire year. Because poultry has a short production cycle, and the reduction could be made up soon by the following season. China\'s pig industry, which is already shocked by the ASF at the end of 2019 ([@bib44]), is hit again by the COVID-19. The production is estimated to decrease by 10.5% and price increased by 25% in 2020 ([@bib51]). Restoring the capacity of pig production has become one of the key tasks of China\'s agricultural development this year. In addition, we should realize that the recovering of all agricultural products is highly constrained by the financial conditions of producers ([@bib39]).

### 3.1.4. Undermine production capacity and sustainability {#sec3.1.4}

If the above short-term impacts are not controlled, they will directly affect the sustainable production capacity of agricultural products. First, the supply chain is difficult to recover once it is broken, because new natural production cycles need a long time to cultivate and restore. The growth cycle for poultry is about six weeks, that of pigs is about three months and that of crops is longer. But food demands are always there. The experts from CAAS believe that the poultry meat supply will continue to decrease in the first half of 2020 under the impact of the epidemic, and it is likely to take at least four months to fully recover ([@bib50]). During the recovering period, the poor would be hurt by the high prices and food shortage ([@bib31]).

Second, the loss in harvest would decrease production investment for the following season. On one hand, the overstocked products brought a huge loss to farmers. Taking chicken as an example, the pandemic have led to a loss of over 12.5 billion yuan (about 1.78 billion dollars) in the first quarter ([@bib46]). On the other hand, the production costs kept increasing during the epidemic. In our survey with 22 representative grain producers, farmers in Jilin province (produces maize, in North China) and Hunan province (produces rice, in South China) claimed that the price of pesticides and fertilizers increased by 200 yuan per ton, 20% higher than the prices before the pandemic. Similarly, cooperatives in Fujian province also claimed that the price of pesticides and fertilizers increased by 20%, and the price of seeds increased by 10%. Without enough money, farmers have no incentives and capacity to continue farming ([@bib12], [@bib14]; [@bib32]).

Third, the decrease in off-farm income affects farmers\' livelihoods, as well as their intentions for production. Our survey found that many small farmers planned to seek off-farm jobs after the epidemic to maintain their livelihood. If so, the amount of abandoned farmland may increase, which would directly affect the production capacity. However, their plans may not be realized; because the off-farm working, which accounts for over 40% of rural households' income in China ([@bib7]), is also squeezed sharply by the pandemic. The unemployment and underemployment of rural migrants is one of the biggest problems during the pandemic ([@bib47]). By March 7th, only 60% of the rural migrants had returned to work. As a result, the disposable income per capita of rural residents declined by 4.7%, and the monthly income per capita of rural migrants decreased by 7.9% in the first quarter ([@bib40]). If these difficulties remain unsolved, more population may step back into poverty and hunger, impacting on the national goal of eliminating poverty by 2020. Constrained by limited cash flow and financial liquidity of farmers, these problems could also affect the agricultural production.

3.2. Government responses {#sec3.2}
-------------------------

Fortunately, the government is targeting these problems. From the end of January to late March, the Chinese government issued 16 urgent notices to ensure an ample supply of food, effective logistics for delivering agricultural inputs and support agricultural production (see [Fig. 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"} ). These notices can be divided into three categories. The first involves unblocking the logistics. The Ministry of Transport has enacted a notice clearly stating that basic living necessities, including agricultural products, are covered in the scope of emergency transportation. Transportation departments at all levels are required to open "green channels" for important agricultural products and give priority to related transportation. The second is to match supply with demand. In addition to CAPMA, MARA also organized other associations and e-commerce enterprises to achieve direct matching and transactions. Farmers and local governments cooperate with e-commerce platforms and arrange livestreaming events to boost online sales. The third is to ensure production of important agricultural products. The measures includes differentiating labor movement control measures in accordance with local risk levels, resuming the agricultural inputs production and logistics, speeding up breeding industry and agricultural production, and direct financial supports ([@bib14]).Fig. 3Timeline of Chinese government responses to alleviate difficulties in agricultural sector as COVID-19 spreads.Abbreviations: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA), Ministry of Commerce (MC), Ministry of Finance (MF), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Transport (MT), China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), Leading Group of the Central Committee on the Response to COVID-19 (LGCC COVID-19).Fig. 3

Since the government took these measures, the problems in agricultural production have been effectively alleviated. By April 24th, CAPMA had organized major agricultural product markets to actively connect with 12 key production and marketing regions. More than 2.24 million tons of overstocked products found buyers. Other e-commerce enterprises sold 88.2 thousand tons, reaching 19.8 million online transactions.

Agricultural inputs are kept flowing. About 78 percent of township-level roads in more than 1500 agricultural counties of 25 provinces was kept open by the end of February ([@bib44]). This proportion increased to 92% by March 22nd ([@bib19]). By the middle of April, 98% of agricultural material enterprises have resumed normal operation and reached 90% of normal production, both percentages higher than those of the same period last year. The "green channels" promoted by the government has worked. 96% of agricultural material branch shops have opened, and 80% of rural households have direct access to inputs buying ([@bib20]). Public services supporting crop production turned to online mode. By April 28th, the China Agricultural Technology Extension Information platform has organized 40 thousand agricultural technicians and 7 thousand experts to answer over 6 million online questions regarding spring planting ([@bib21]).

Consequently, the production and supply of agricultural products is recovering fast from the COVID-19 outbreak. Stimulated by the strong supports by the government, farmers plant 313 thousand more hectares of early rice than the last year ([@bib25]). Compared to February, the amount of live hog in stock increased by 3.6% in March. The poultry industry turned to making profits in March in spite of the huge loss in February. The total acreage of vegetables is over 4.47 million hectares in March, an increase of 1.33 million hectares than that in February ([@bib22]). The supply of livestock sector and vegetables has resumed normal by April.

As a result, the consumer price index (CPI) fell gradually. On the basis of February, the consumer price index (CPI) fell 2.87% in May. Food prices dropped 9.95%. The price of grain was stable, and the price of edible oil dropped 0.50%. The marketing quantity of vegetables increased, and the price of fresh vegetables dropped 29.32%. The price of pork was reduced by 20.94%. The price of eggs, aquatic products, and fresh fruit dropped 9.97%, 2.34%, and 3.18%, respectively.

4. Concluding remarks {#sec4}
=====================

The experiences in China indicate that difficulties in agricultural production should be attached importance to as COVID-19 spreads. The impacts of the epidemic on food supply chain started immediately from the "midstream" or "downstream" part, then will extend upward to the "upstream" production part. The former has drawn wide attention, while the latter has not. With more production-undermining cases observed around the world, we need to take urgent actions to prevent or mitigate the negative effects. Especially for developing countries, protecting agricultural production is the key to ensure food security and people\'s livelihood. China\'s experiences could offer some suggestion to cope up with those challenges.

**Ensure effective logistics for agricultural products.** Prevention and control measures should not interfere the transportation channels for agricultural products. It is necessary to ensure the smooth connection of supply-and-demand information. Regarding the sale of agricultural products, priority must be determined according to the storage characteristics of each product. The availability of cereal products must be ensured at all times. Also, perishable products, such as vegetables and milk, can be transported to suburbs to ease the sales pressure. In addition, e-commerce and delivery companies can help promote the connection between production and sales.

**Ensure effective supply of critical inputs.** It is important to open a \"green channel\" for agricultural production inputs and to ban unauthorized roadblocks. For rural areas where the epidemic is mild, village governors can organize farmers to go to their fields separately at different times. In areas where conditions permit, mechanized service and intelligent equipments should be promoted to reduce labor density. For the livestocks and poultry industry, the feed and veterinary medicine supply must be maintained. Fertilizer, pesticides and feed production should keep in operation above the basic demand line. The government, industrial associations and agricultural cooperatives should help promote the purchase and delivery of critical agricultural inputs.

**Provide various** **supports** **to agricultural production and farmers.** Anti-epidemic training and necessary epidemic prevention materials must be provided to production and logistics sectors. Also, compensation measures should be introduced to support production. For farmers or farms with difficulties in production, targeted subsidies or low-interest loans should be provided. Rural poverty-stricken households should be given income subsidies to ensure their livelihood. By implementing these measures, farmers' motivations for agricultural production can be strengthened and the capital, technology, and labor inputs for the next crop season can be guaranteed.

**Make use of innovative methods to promote sales.** Food demand during the epidemic is only suppressed by prevention and control measures temporarily. The key is to find a new bridge to match supply to demand as the traditional offline channels are cut off. The e-commerce has shown enormous potential. The online platforms of the government, industrial associations and enterprises can help share market information and find new sales channels. The livestreaming events and online promotion could revive sales of overstocked agricultural products. The delivery companies also play important roles to ensure the well-functioning of food supply chain. Some new services, such as contactless delivery and shared pick-up points, could be provided to minimize human-to-human interactions.
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